Strikes on energy infrastructure, fighting in Donbas, and negotiations without illusions: political and military highlights of November 3

1. On November 3, Volodymyr Zelensky addressed the Berlin Security Conference, where he spoke about the need to strengthen Europe’s role amid the possibility of a further decline in U.S. influence. According to the Ukrainian president, security and freedom in Europe cannot be ensured without Germany. He also emphasized that Ukraine does not intend to accept negotiating terms that would require Ukrainian leaders to travel to moscow or hold formal telephone conversations with vladimir putin. Zelensky insists that a ceasefire must be the genuine first step toward ending the war.

Against this backdrop, Kyiv is preparing for further diplomatic contacts with the American and European sides. Zelensky announced upcoming meetings in Brussels involving representatives of the U.S., Europe, NATO, and Ukraine, where a recovery package and security guarantees will be discussed.

Thus, Ukrainian diplomacy is pursuing two objectives simultaneously: maintaining American mediation, which is essential to the negotiation process, while seeking to strengthen the independent role of European states in ensuring Ukraine’s security.

For Kyiv, it is particularly important that any potential agreements with moscow do not turn into a bilateral compromise between Washington and the kremlin at the expense of Ukrainian interests. Zelensky’s statements in Berlin indicate Ukraine’s determination to secure more sustainable European support and prevent real negotiations from being replaced by a mere imitation of diplomatic activity.

2. Russia continued its massive campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. During the night and morning of November 3, russian forces attacked Ukraine with ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as 289 attack drones. According to DTEK, three of its thermal power plants came under attack. All three plants stopped generating electricity due to extensive damage.

According to Ukrenergo, over the past 24 hours, russian forces deliberately attacked energy facilities more than 20 times. Emergency power cuts had to be introduced in several regions, including Kyiv. According to the city authorities, the electricity supply situation in the capital has become extremely difficult.

The current wave of attacks demonstrates that the russian command continues to use energy infrastructure as one of its main instruments of pressure on Ukrainian society. The approaching winter makes the consequences of such strikes particularly dangerous: damage to generating facilities and power grids simultaneously complicates the provision of electricity, heating, and water.

For Ukraine, this is not only a humanitarian problem but also an economic one. The need to constantly restore damaged facilities requires substantial financial and technical resources, while restrictions on energy supplies create additional difficulties for industry, transport, and the operation of critical infrastructure.

Under these circumstances, protecting energy facilities, developing reserve capacity, and obtaining equipment from Western partners for the rapid restoration of the power system become particularly important.

3. Fighting on the front line remains highly intense. According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 201 combat engagements had taken place by the evening of November 3. Russian forces launched 50 airstrikes, dropped 160 guided aerial bombs, deployed 3,910 kamikaze drones, and carried out 1,865 attacks on populated areas and Ukrainian military positions.

The enemy continues to exert the greatest pressure on Ukrainian defenses in Donbas. In the Kostiantynivka sector, the Defense Forces repelled 24 assaults; in the Pokrovsk sector, 15. In the Sloviansk sector, eight attempts by russian units to advance were halted, and in the Lyman sector, five.

The overall intensity of the fighting indicates that the russian command is not reducing the pace of its offensive operations, despite significant losses in personnel and equipment. The situation remains particularly dangerous in the Kostiantynivka and Pokrovsk sectors. There, russian forces are attempting to put simultaneous pressure on Ukrainian defenses, find opportunities to advance, and threaten the lines of communication of Ukrainian units.

For Donbas, this means a continued high risk of further destruction in frontline settlements and worsening conditions for the evacuation of civilians. At the same time, even localized advances by the enemy can complicate Ukrainian logistics and create additional threats to cities that remain under Ukrainian control.

4. Russian strikes on civilian facilities in the Donetsk oblast continue. According to the regional police, 1,714 attacks on the front line and residential areas were recorded over the previous 24 hours. Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, Sloviansk, Bilenke, and Yasna Poliana came under fire. A total of 23 civilian facilities were damaged, including 10 residential buildings.

On November 3, russian forces dropped four FAB-250 aerial bombs equipped with UMPK guidance kits on the settlement of Yasnohirka in the Kramatorsk community. A woman was killed and five other people were injured. Sixteen homes were damaged.

These attacks show that russian forces continue to systematically use aerial bombs and drones against settlements located near the front line. Moreover, the danger to civilians comes not only from massive shelling but also from constant targeted FPV drone strikes against civilian vehicles and residential buildings.

For the Ukrainian authorities, this means having to address evacuation, the safety of the population that remains, and the continued operation of municipal and medical services simultaneously. The closer the front line gets, the harder it becomes to maintain normal living conditions in cities and towns.

5. The Security Service of Ukraine reported that it had exposed a resident of the occupied part of the Luhansk oblast who headed the H. I. Petrovsky Chemical State Association in 2025–2026 and assisted the russian military-industrial complex.

Before the russian aggression, the enterprise specialized in the production of explosives and ammunition. In 2014, it was seized by representatives of the "LNR" group. Production was subsequently suspended, but substantial quantities of products and equipment remained in its warehouses. One of the units of the russian occupation army is currently stationed on the enterprise’s premises.

According to the SBU, after the enterprise was re-registered under russian law in December 2024, its new head organized the systematic transportation of equipment and products to russia. In particular, a batch of industrial equipment was delivered to the Ural Solikamsk Plant in May 2025, while in August the Perm Powder Plant received more than 340 tonnes of a chemical component used to manufacture solid rocket fuel and artillery propellant.

Both enterprises are part of the Rostec state corporation and participate in the production of weapons for the war against Ukraine.

This case demonstrates that russia uses occupied territories not only as a source of manpower and a site for deploying military units, but also as part of its own military-industrial system. The removal of equipment and chemical products makes it possible to use the remaining production resources of seized enterprises in the interests of the russian military-industrial complex.

For Ukraine, this creates additional risks, since the industrial potential of the occupied territories, which could otherwise be used to rebuild the Ukrainian economy, is effectively being integrated into the military infrastructure of the aggressor state.

6. The construction of commercial housing continues in Mariupol on the sites of destroyed apartment buildings, whose residents had been promised replacement apartments by the occupation authorities. According to the Mariupol City Council, on Metalurhiv Avenue, where at least seven damaged buildings were demolished in 2023, a russian developer is building the "Leningradsky Quarter".

By October 2026, four buildings had been completed, and the entire complex is scheduled for completion by 2028. The apartments are already on sale. A one-bedroom apartment costs around $80,000. According to the city council, buyers include russian security service personnel and officials.

The situation on Metalurhiv Avenue highlights the contradiction between the occupation administration’s public promises to restore housing for affected residents and the actual commercial model being used to redevelop the city.

Real estate intended for buyers from russia who can afford it is appearing on the sites of buildings where Mariupol residents lived before the russian invasion. Meanwhile, many former owners of destroyed homes have still not received the compensation they were promised.

Thus, the reconstruction of Mariupol is being used not only as a propaganda tool but also as a mechanism for redistributing the city’s real estate. The commercial interests of new developers and buyers are proving more important than resolving the housing problems of people who lost their homes as a result of russian aggression.

7. Serious electricity supply problems have also arisen in occupied Crimea. On November 3, the occupation-run enterprise Krymenergo reported that electricity supplies to the peninsula had been cut off due to an accident on main power grids outside the peninsula.

The so-called governor of Sevastopol, Mikhail Razvozhayev, acknowledged that the available electricity supply was sufficient for only about one-third of the city’s residential buildings. As a possible power supply schedule, he cited a "two hours with electricity — six hours without electricity" arrangement.

The current blackout has once again demonstrated the vulnerability of the occupied peninsula’s energy system and its dependence on external main power grids. Even an accident outside Crimea can lead to large-scale electricity restrictions affecting residential areas and urban infrastructure.

For the occupation administration, this creates additional problems in providing the population with basic utility services. Such disruptions are particularly disruptive amid the ongoing militarization of the peninsula and the heavy strain on its infrastructure.

In a broader context, the situation shows how limited the occupation authorities’ ability is to ensure the reliable operation of essential services in a territory that russia has declared its own but has still failed to free from infrastructure vulnerabilities.