Serhii Harmash: AFU’s voluntary withdrawal from Donbas would legitimize russia’s annexation

Russia is intensifying its public rhetoric about the need for the withdrawal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from Donbas as a key condition for ending hostilities, while simultaneously shifting responsibility for their continuation onto Kyiv. Against this background, discrepancies are being recorded in the statements of the Ukrainian and American sides regarding the conditions for achieving peace and providing security guarantees.

In the kremlin’s logic, full control over the Donetsk oblast remains fundamental, since abandoning it would mean a political defeat and loss of control over territory that in russia is considered its own. At the same time, in other directions, there is room for possible compromises. Meanwhile, within russia, pressure is growing due to the prolonged war, which is forcing the kremlin to look for ways to end it with minimal costs.

Political expert and former member of the Ukrainian delegation to the Minsk TCG Serhii Harmash spoke in an interview with OstroV about possible scenarios for the development of the situation, the positions of the United States and Europe, as well as risks for Ukraine.

— Recently, kremlin’s representatives actively began talking about the fact that stopping hostilities depends on the voluntary AFU’s withdrawal from the entire territory of Donbas. Within just a couple of days, statements by Peskov and Ushakov were made on this topic. Previously, such conditions appeared in the media citing sources. What do you associate this with?

— I will start with the fact that the very demand for the withdrawal of the AFU from the Donetsk oblast is not new. It was not voiced directly by President Zelensky during his presentation of the 20-point plan, which was allegedly agreed by Ukraine with the United States, but it was clearly read between the lines. There it was called “territorial agreements”, which included option A — a ceasefire along the front line; and option B — the creation of a free economic zone. The latter, in fact, meant demilitarization of the region, that is, the withdrawal of the AFU. However, this would not have given moscow jurisdiction over this territory. After that, it was repeatedly stated that russia does not agree to such “territorial agreements”. Therefore, putin’s desires, no matter how our negotiators tried to mask them so as not to alarm Ukrainians, were obvious — actual control over the Donetsk oblast. And this is understandable. I have probably been saying for four years that putin himself will not stop until he captures Donbas, because for him stopping before that moment would mean defeat in the war. After all, russia has already written the so-called “DNR” and “LNR” into its constitution as subjects of the federation. And they, in turn, have enshrined in their “constitutions” that their territories coincide with the administrative borders of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine. That is, it would turn out that part of the “russian”, in the understanding of russians, territory remains “occupied” by Ukraine.

— So, will the war in any case continue until the complete capture of Donbas?

— I said that putin himself will not stop. But he can be stopped by creating conditions where the kremlin will see that the cost is disproportionate to the gain, that it is more beneficial to put on a brave face in a bad situation and go for a compromise that can be interpreted as a victory, rather than risk an obvious defeat. And such a threat for him exists.

— Considering that four oblasts of Ukraine have been included in russia’s constitution, is their demand only for Donbas a compromise on russia’s part, or how should this be understood?

— This is a myth. Four Ukrainian oblats have not been included in the constitution of the russian federation! Their constitution includes the so-called “DNR” and “LNR”. And already in their “constitutions” it is fixed that their territory corresponds to the administrative borders of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

The fact that the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts are included in russia’s constitution as subjects of the russian federation does not mean that we are talking about territories within the borders of the corresponding Ukrainian oblasts. These may be different territories. Moreover, the charters of these “subjects of the federation” do not specify exactly which territories they include.

If russia feels that it is capable of continuing the war and capturing, for example, Zaporizhzhia or Kherson completely, it will move further. But for it, this is not a fundamental issue. Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts are important for moscow primarily from the point of view of a land corridor to Crimea — and it already has this corridor; control over Kherson or Zaporizhzhia is not needed for its functioning. But Donbas is fundamentally important, since the territory of the Donetsk oblast controlled by Kyiv, in the logic of russians, will be considered “territory of the russian federation occupied by Ukraine”. And this is extremely sensitive for the kremlin.

— You said that there is already a threat for putin of suffering an obvious defeat. What did you mean?

— By analogy — no matter how the war in Iran ends, Trump has already lost it! Because both the Americans themselves and their partners have received more problems from it than benefits. America has shown its strength, but also made its weaknesses obvious. Its security guarantees to the monarchies of the Middle East have proven ineffective. Its military bases have become targets. Strategic tools of influence on the global economy have ended up in the hands of the Iranians, and Trump cannot do anything about it. That is, the balance of positives and negatives from this war in the eyes of public opinion is clearly not in Trump’s favor. And even if tomorrow he unblocks the Strait of Hormuz, it is unlikely that anyone will see this as a victory — rather as a correction of his own mistakes.

The same applies to a theoretical capture by the enemy of Kramatorsk/Sloviansk in a year, against the backdrop of deteriorating living conditions for russians, growing problems in the russian economy, and the loss of at least 300 thousand personnel… Will this be considered a victory? And what if Ukraine does not stop after that and continues trying to reclaim its territories? If it continues striking russian oil and gas facilities? If Trump is no longer there by then, and there is no one to pressure Kyiv? Will the war become endless? And will the russian budget be able to sustain it, if even today putin is forced to ask businesses for money? And will the enemy have enough mobilization resources if there is no money to pay contract soldiers, and russians do not want to fight “for an idea”? In fact, the “idea” itself has already grown stale for them.

And already now Kyiv has destroyed 40% of the russia’s oil export capacity. Last month, the number of our UAVs in the russian sky exceeded the number of russian ones in Ukraine. The elections in Hungary… That is, the global trends for the kremlin are negative, despite short-term gains from rising oil prices.

— Do you think putin understands this?

— And here we return to your first question. Judging by how persistently moscow is voicing the “price of the issue”, I think it already wants to stop. Wants to, but cannot without Donbas. Russia needs a pause to recover, adjust public sentiment, and prepare for a new, but this time truly “small and victorious” war. And even the leak from a closed (!) meeting of putin with oligarchs, where he said “we will keep fighting”, seems to me not accidental. This is PSYOP, a signal to Washington to force the White House to pressure Zelensky and fulfill Trump’s Anchorage commitments regarding the withdrawal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from Donbas. And a signal to Kyiv that russia is ready to keep fighting until the full capture of Donbas, no matter what. But I have a question: if you want to fight — then fight, why shout about the price for you to stop fighting? Which means, if there is a price, then there is no real desire to fight…

— And why now?

— Because after the fiasco in Iran, Trump does not need another fiasco in Ukraine. And he is apparently putting pressure on russia as well. Not for nothing, even during the war in Iran, U.S. negotiations with Ukraine and russia in a bilateral format continue. And moscow, again taking advantage of Trump’s weakness after Iran, and the growth of its tactical importance for the U.S. (due to assistance to Tehran and the upcoming negotiations between Trump and Xi), reminds him: first fulfill your commitments and force Kyiv to withdraw the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the Donetsk oblast, and then we will fulfill ours — we will let you announce peace in Ukraine.

— Can putin stop at least temporarily, without full control over Donbas?

— Here it is important to clarify what exactly is meant. If we are talking about some short-term ceasefire — no. If about freezing the war, theoretically it is possible. But such a halt must be something he can sell to his society and have grounds for it.

Putin may try to sell the idea of, for example, a free economic zone or a demilitarized zone. For him, this is certainly not a favorable option, but theoretically possible. However, for such a scenario to be implemented, Ukrainian troops would have to leave that territory. It is impossible to talk about a free economic or demilitarized zone if Ukrainian forces remain there. And this is unacceptable for Kyiv.

— It is said that Zelensky proposed the idea of a FEZ to Trump. And quite a long time ago…

— I have also heard another version many times that, on the contrary, it was the Americans who proposed such an option to Zelensky, and he is not implementing it.

Here, perhaps, the issue lies in the details. Zelensky could have proposed a free economic zone under the flag of Ukraine. Trump, in turn, could have proposed to putin an “extraterritorial” version of a FEZ, under the management of an international administration, for example. Putin, on the other hand, may view a free economic zone as a compromise, but exclusively under the flag of the russian federation. And these are precisely the fundamental differences due to which the sides are likely unable to reach an agreement.

Another scenario cannot be ruled out. It is possible that Zelensky did at some stage consider such an option, but then Europe promised support for several more years of war, and a decision was made to continue as long as there are resources. Because if there is an opportunity to strategically weaken russia — to draw it into a prolonged war, inflict heavy losses on it, so that it will not be able to attack us in the future — then the president must think strategically. We often look at the situation tactically because we just want peace. But the president must have a different scale of perspective. This option also cannot be ruled out.

— What are the risks in the voluntary withdrawal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from Donbas?

— The most serious risk is the de facto legitimization of annexation. If we voluntarily withdraw troops, it means we recognize this territory as russian. This creates a dangerous precedent: russia will be able to claim that Kyiv has thus de facto recognized all the territories it has occupied and annexed as russian.

Even if de jure we do not recognize this, de facto it will become a strong argument against us. In the future, this will practically deprive us of the opportunity to return these territories through diplomatic means. We will be told: “You left, which means you recognized russian jurisdiction over those territories”.

There is a dangerous historical analogy: Western countries (including the U.S. and the United Kingdom) never de jure recognized the annexation of the Baltic states by the USSR in 1939. But de facto, until 1991, they considered them part of the Soviet Union and even helped restore soviet sovereignty over them in the 1940s.

This is a key strategic danger. It must not be allowed. If the situation becomes critical (there are no resources, finances, support, manpower…) and the loss of territory becomes inevitable, then under no circumstances should troops be withdrawn officially. It is better at least to simulate the loss of these territories as a result of unsuccessful combat operations.

— Recently Zelensky stated that the U.S. set a condition: for Ukraine to receive security guarantees, it must withdraw its troops from Donbas. Later, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio publicly denied this. What do such public discrepancies indicate? That there is no unified strategy or common understanding?

— I think it is precisely about differences in wording and emphasis. This can be called a mismatch. The fact is that both Zelensky and Rubio are essentially telling the truth.

The logic here is as follows: to receive security guarantees, peace must be established. And for that peace to be achieved — under russia’s conditions — Ukraine must withdraw its troops from Donbas. Until this happens, there will be neither peace nor security guarantees. Zelensky emphasized one aspect, Rubio another, but the essence is generally the same.

— Can the U.S. officially and publicly take such a step — effectively propose or demand that Ukraine withdraw from its sovereign territory?

— I am sure there will be no official demand of that kind. Because then it would be Trump’s decision, not Ukraine’s. And that would delegitimize such a step in terms of international law. Trump may apply pressure, may try to force us to accept a decision he needs, but it still has to be our decision. This is fundamentally important for him and for russia in terms of law and diplomacy.

— If, in your opinion, the kremlin also already allows for the possibility of a compromise, are there signs of preparing public opinion in russia for it? For example, in connection with the recent strict internet restrictions? I have come across the opinion that in this way putin is either preparing escalation and mobilization, or, on the contrary, a possible pause in the war, trying in advance to take control of potential discontent.

— It is difficult to give a definitive answer. It seems to me that russia as a whole is moving along the path of strengthening control over society, further “tightening the screws”. And this is inevitable under any scenario.

If the war is stopped, dissatisfied “patriots” will appear, and they will need to be controlled. If the war continues, discontent will grow among ordinary russians, whose lives are deteriorating. Already now it is clear that ordinary citizens increasingly do not understand what all this is for: why blood is being shed, why people are dying, if life is becoming worse, not better. Therefore, I would not directly link internet restrictions to any specific scenario. Both options are possible. But the key point here is different: if the kremlin is tightening the screws, it means it sees and acknowledges that the wheels are already rattling and may fall off.

It is obvious that in moscow an understanding is forming that something must be done about this war — it needs to be somehow concluded, because it no longer brings the benefits it did in the early years, its potential has been exhausted, today it generates only negatives: social, economic, military, and geopolitical.

Accordingly, there is now a search for the least painful way out of the war. At the same time, as usual, this is accompanied by a large amount of bluffing, raising the stakes, and demonstrating “inevitable victoriousness”. Even when the situation worsens, inside the system they continue to say that “everything is fine”.

Strategically, the need to somehow resolve the “Ukrainian issue” has already matured in moscow. And this means that no matter how events develop further, dissatisfaction among various electoral groups will still exist in any scenario. Accordingly, certain steps are already being taken to reduce people’s ability to communicate, thereby lowering the level of social tension in advance.

As for internet restrictions, in my view there is another factor: putin himself does not use the internet and may not fully understand its importance for society. For many people, it is already a critically important part of life. The absence of the internet may be perceived by them as even more painful than a reduction in social payments. This can turn people against the authorities more strongly than whether the war in Ukraine continues or not. I am not talking about riots, but about silent, yet aggressive indifference toward the authorities. When people no longer care what happens to it. A similar mood existed at the end of the USSR. So, by tightening the screws, they can also strip them.

By Vladyslav Bulatchik, OstroV