Pavlo Lakiichuk: The summer offensive failed, but russia is preparing a new campaign, the enemy has not abandoned plans to capture all of Donbas

The russian summer offensive campaign, which was supposed to become a turning point in the war, ended without achieving its stated goals. Despite this, moscow is not winding down combat operations. The main objective remains Donbas. It is here that russian troops continue assaults in the areas of Pokrovsk, Kostiantynivka, Druzhkivka, and Myrnohrad.

At the same time, on other sectors of the front — in particular, on the Novopavlivka and Zaporizhzhia directions — local attacks are being recorded with the aim of improving tactical positions. But experts believe that until the russians achieve their goals in Donbas, there will be no full-scale redeployment of forces to the south or to the Kharkiv oblast.

Against this background, discussions continue about the possibility of transferring Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine. However, by various estimates, this issue so far remains more of a political signal than a real solution.

On the situation at the front, the results of the summer campaign, russia’s preparation for a new offensive, threats to Pokrovsk and Kupiansk, as well as the prospects for Western arms deliveries, OstroV spoke with the head of security programs at the Center for Global Studies “Strategy XXI”, retired 1st Rank Navy Captain Pavlo Lakiichuk.

– How would you assess the situation on the front today?

– The defense is holding, and that’s a positive thing. The enemy is advancing — that’s a negative one. Overall, it’s not correct to say that any radical changes have occurred in the enemy’s plans.

Indeed, the summer operation, from the attacker’s point of view, failed. Why did it fail? Because the resources allocated to accomplish its tasks (and it’s now obvious that the main task was the capture of northwestern Donbas) were not sufficient to achieve it.

They did not accomplish that task, yet the resources were expended. So Gerasimov had to replan the operation. That’s what he meant when he was shown on television: “We will continue the autumn offensive”. In other words, a new operation is being planned, resources are being allocated, and it will be implemented.

– Is this something radically new?

– One might have expected that when planning a new operation the directions of main strikes, timing, and priorities would change, but apparently they decided not to bother too much. The main directions of attack and objectives remained unchanged. At least for now this is visible if you look at the battlefield. That is Pokrovsk, Kostiantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, which closes the northern approach toward Sloviansk. This is the main battlefield, the principal axis of the enemy’s efforts.

In this context, combat operations continue. And you already know what is happening at the tactical level: on the main axis there is a breakthrough toward Dobropillia to the north, which the russians do not want to abandon despite all our efforts. They are throwing many reserves there. Their logic is as follows: the main thing is to get a foothold.

In the south, it is worth noting the Novopavlivka direction. There are frequent statements that “the second objective will be Zaporizhzhia — we’ll start an offensive there, a second offensive”. But it must be understood that they only have resources for one strategic offensive.

Therefore we assumed: if the russians, God forbid, succeed this spring or summer in accomplishing their main task in Donbas, they could shift their main efforts southward, to the southern front. That would be the most logical move, because the Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts are important to them, but in the south russia has far greater capabilities both militarily and politically.

Moreover, the russians need to justify why the “originally russian” Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts are still controlled by the “Ukrainian regime”. Therefore this direction has both political and military rationale for them.

But until they accomplish, in my view, the task in Donbas, they will not redeploy forces there, because that is task number one. They must complete it. If they can, then they will shift efforts.

On the Kurakhove direction the enemy has had success and is developing it. It has already reached the lines where we expected a southern offensive. And now it is advancing from the east, i.e., it is outflanking the lines that had been established. That is an additional problem.

And although this is not the enemy’s main strike direction, it turns out that here, in terms of forces expended and committed, they are acting most effectively. And so far our defensive forces cannot solve this problem.

On the Zaporizhzhia front tactical actions are being carried out to consolidate positions and seize advantageous lines from the perspective of the russian strategic command. At the operational level, the generals fighting in this sector understand: if they don’t produce results, they will be sent east, where they and their units will be wiped out. So they are demonstrating activity.

– In recent days I’ve seen some military reports that the situation around Pokrovsk has once again intensified. In your view, are there specific threats to Pokrovsk now?

– Those threats haven’t disappeared. I wouldn’t say the situation has sharply worsened. There was a certain weakening of enemy efforts in the south and southwest because they were waiting for the result of their northern breakthrough. Here the dilemma is: storm head-on or encircle the city. The encircling is a higher priority for them.

The Ukrainian defense forces are not allowing them to resolve this dilemma. That’s why fierce fighting continues north of Pokrovsk. Our command reports a counteroffensive; I would say it’s a counterstrike. The enemy is also pulling up reserves.

And these are strong reserves — the same marines. They are not going to give in. It’s still far from over. Meanwhile, in the south and southwest movement is also necessary. So there will constantly be tension there. Regardless of how hot it gets north of Pokrovsk, it will also be hot in the south.

– But is it still too early to say that in the near future Ukrainian troops will have to retreat from the city?

– It is too early to say that Pokrovsk needs to be abandoned. But under certain circumstances, such a situation could arise. And this needs to be known and remembered. If the russians, God forbid, manage to encircle from three directions and cut off the lines of communication, it will be a very difficult battle.

For example, right now on the Kostiantynivka direction near the Kleban-Byk reservoir, there is active defense. The russians and their various bloggers have already said about five times that the Ukrainians south of the reservoir were supposedly destroyed and that they reached the line.

I don’t quite understand why we are holding defense south of the reservoir — the conditions there are extremely difficult. On the right, left, and front — russians; and behind is the reservoir, a kind of trap. It’s a very attractive target for the enemy.

If troops are pulled back from the reservoir, the situation changes: the water area becomes a natural element of our defensive line.

– Today there was also a report claiming that taking Kupiansk is just a matter of time and the point of no return has already been passed. Do you agree?

– No. Obviously, this is explained by the start of urban combat. It is always easier to prevent the enemy’s breakthrough than to drive them out afterward. Take, for example, Vovchansk — how long has it been, over a year? They entered the urban area, and now driving them out is practically impossible.

That’s why people say the battles in Kupiansk will last a long time, and how they will end is unknown. But the enemy’s main goal is not Kupiansk itself. Kupiansk is just an excuse for putin or Lavrov to say: “Here, we’ve captured another Ukrainian city again”.

And the main objective is Kupiansk-Uzlovyi. This is a settlement a few kilometers south of Kupiansk, at a major railway junction. It provides access to the Kharkiv direction, to the Lyman direction, to Svatove and, most importantly, to the north — toward Voronezh and Belgorod oblasts.

To continue pressing on the Lyman direction and across the entire northern flank of the Siversk salient, they need a bypass road, a railway, logistics. That’s why they are pushing there — the capture of Kupiansk-Uzlovyi gives them that capability.

– There’s a lot of talk now about “Tomahawks”. Why is this weapon so important for Ukraine and what could it change?

– Every time we receive more powerful weapons, there’s a lot of talk about their superpower that will turn the tide of the war. I don’t think so.

This is not the first time we’ve asked for Tomahawks. I know that through unofficial channels Ukrainians have asked the Americans for Tomahawks many times over the past two years. The unofficial answer was: no. This time, in my view, Zelensky raised the stakes to the maximum before Trump. It’s our Ukrainian tactic: we ask for more, we bargain, and we meet somewhere in the middle.

Perhaps, even if we are refused Tomahawks, Trump will still be forced to act. If Trump is playing the “annoy putin” game, to force him into negotiations, he might say: “I will give the Ukrainians Tomahawks”. Such blackmail only works when backed by action. If not Tomahawks, then he must give something. And Zelensky understands this, so he raised the stake.

Will we get Tomahawks? I’m not sure. This is primarily a naval weapon: the main launchers are sea-based. Coastal versions exist, but even their transfer is unlikely — there’s already a queue for them within the US Army. They were only adopted in 2023, and the priority is with the US Army. So even if a decision to transfer is made, we’ll have to wait, as was the case with the Abrams.

When we asked for tanks, the Americans under Biden dragged their feet and said: “Take German Leopards, Abrams are too complicated for you”. Then they agreed to a small number and delivered a simplified version. For example, Abrams have a layer of depleted uranium in their composite armor — a very strong material. For partners, including Ukraine, that layer was removed.

So the Abrams we received were specially modified for Ukraine with reduced combat capabilities. The same could happen with the Tomahawks.

There’s also the question of funding. Everyone has seen the US defense budget for this year. 500 million dollars seems like a large amount, but two years ago the figures were completely different. If you add the Tomahawks project to this aid, it will be difficult to implement. If it’s done together with the Europeans — then the conversation has to include three parties.

– Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of russia Dmitry Medvedev threatened a nuclear response to possible Tomahawk deliveries. Are they really that afraid of this weapon?

– That’s russia’s strategy. Every time we receive a new type of weapon from the Americans, there is a certain sequence of reactions. The first stage is denial: “No, this won’t happen because Ukrainians aren’t capable of operating it”. The second is intimidation: “Don’t deliver it to Ukraine, this is escalation, it will be war with America”. The third is an attempt to stop the delivery during implementation. And the fourth is when they say: “They can’t make it work anyway”.

That’s how it was with HIMARS, Storm Shadow, F-16s. Everything follows the same pattern.

– If Ukraine does get these missiles, can we talk about some kind of turning point in the war?

– There is no “game changer”, no “wonder weapon”. “The wonder weapon” is the Ukrainian soldier. Our officers, our soldiers — that’s the superweapon we have. Everything else is just an addition.

Success or failure on the battlefield depends on the hardware and the tactics of its use. Comprehensive, skilled use of weapons gives results.

By the way, an interesting situation arises with many types of Western weapons: Ukrainians, whom russians say can’t and won’t be able to use them, demonstrate to Americans and Europeans new capabilities of this equipment that even the developers hadn’t anticipated.

– What should we expect in the near future in terms of the war and russia’s strategy?

– Russia is conducting three strategic offensive operations. The first is against Ukraine, they will continue the ground offensive, more precisely, carry out the autumn-winter campaign.

The second is hybrid war in Europe. And this, in a broad sense, is also part of our war. They will increase the number of provocations in Europe, irritate the Europeans.

And the third component is a strategic air operation. Its goal, if there is no success on the front, is to force concessions. And here they will put in maximum effort. Note: compared to last year, their capabilities have increased tenfold, while our air defense hasn’t grown at the same pace. So it’s going to be difficult.

By Vladyslav Bulatchik, OstroV